Read this surprisingly-refreshing piece entitled "Assessing Regional Diffusion from Brussels to Addis Ababa: The Limits of Modelling and Mentoring", which explores the "integration snobbery" theme of other regionalisms seeing the EU by hook or by crook as a model, but refracted through the prism of the African Union.
from: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/green/papers/workingpapers/haastrup_assessing_regional_diffusion.pdf
"Another challenge is the EU‟s „over-ambition‟ to promote regional integration (Börzel & Risse, 2009b). While the normative ideals being promoted by the EU might themselves be unproblematic, diffusion through the EU faces the potential criticism of being neo-colonial and arrogant. This is then problematic if the essence of EU-Africa relations, and indeed the cultivation of African integration is to give Africa a better seat at the table to represent its citizens. Further, the EU faces challenges to its own integration. A recent report in the Economist suggested that the difficulty the EU had in reaching a conclusion on the Greek bailout and the Eurozone crises endangers the integration project. Perhaps exaggerated, reports like these engender the negative perception of third parties, especially budding regional institutions like the AU, to the „EU as a Model‟ paradigm."
ENDs
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
PAPER: "Assessing Regional Diffusion from Brussels to Addis Ababa: The Limits of Modelling and Mentoring"
Of 9th, 11th, and 21st September, or Unleashing the AUfrican Lion to the World
“The Accidental Ecowas
& AU Citizen”:
Of 9th, 11th, and 21st September, or Unleashing the AU-frican Lion to the World
By E.K.Bensah Jr
I am not surprised much of the
Ghanaian media missed it; I could not have expected anything less. It was
always going to be obvious that they would remember the much-publicised 10th
anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the US and be totally oblivious to
developments on the continent. If we had a media more sensitized to what was
going on in Africa and its regional economic communities, we might have had
more column inches on one major anniversary and a conference that ended on that
all-important anniversary.
9th September is “Sirte Declaration Day”…
The all-important anniversary is
that of 9th September. This day is ineluctably etched in African
integration history as a day when the Sirte Declaration was mooted in Libya.
The significance of this declaration has to do with the fact that it is the
resolution adopted by the-then Organisation
of African Unity on 9 September 1999, at the fourth Extraordinary Session
of the OAU Assembly of African Heads of State and Government held at Sirte, Libya. Policy-makers and
aficionados of African unity remember Sirte to be blazing the trail on where
Africa needs to go. If we can remember the importance of the Abuja Treaty of
1991 setting the blueprint for continental integration, then we can accept
Sirte to be the engine for that integration. With it, three major things
happened.
First, it set the tone for the
establishment of the African
Union as we know it today; second,
it speeded up the implementation of the provisions of the Abuja Treaty, to create an
African
Economic Community, and its attendant Pan-African institutions of the
Nigeria-based African
Central Bank; Cameroon-based African Monetary Fund;
the African Court of Justice; ( Libya-based African Investment Bank ) and Pan-African
Parliament, with the Parliament to be established by 2000. Third, it
prepared a Constitutive
Act of the African Union that would be ratified by 31 December 2000 and
become effective the following year in 2001.
…and the “real” African Union day
Also unbeknownst to the Ghanaian
media was the highly-important fifth edition of the Conference of African Ministers
of Integration (COMAI V). Held in Kenya from 5-9 September, the
objective of the meeting was three-fold: to consider the report of the “Status
of Integration in Africa 2011”; and a report on the “implementation of
Recommendations from COMAI IV”; and review a study on “the quantification of
scenarios of rationalization of RECs”.
Simply put, the rationalization
of RECs refers to AU member states deciding to stick to one regional economic
community – instead of the two or three some of them belong to. Policy-makers
at the UNECA and AU Commission see this as pivotal to achieving the African
Economic Community by 2034. Of equal importance, also, is the Continental
Integration Fund for supporting the UNECA-sponsored “Minimum Integration
Programme” that will help RECs deliver on harmonization of programmes
consistent with the Abuja Treaty. On that, the African Development Bank is
ready to support ways of resourcing this facility that will complement existing
alternative financing mechanisms identified by the AU for unity.
Truth be told, if there is
anything we can say about 9 September, it is that it is the veritable “African
union” day. That the unfortunate events of
9/11 took place two days after
one of the most important and significant events of African integration is
perhaps a harbinger/metaphor of how African integration was doomed to run on
the back of the so-called War on Terror.
Terrorism, 9/11, and 21 September
Not that this does not matter,
but in Africa, the almost over-kill of September 11 is only as poignant as
African countries choose to make it. Few can forget that East Africa
experienced a spate of terrorist attacks during the “War on Terror” decade. It
is also regrettable that the decade would “close” with attacks in West Africa
with the bombing of the UN building in Abuja allegedly by Boko Haram. But can
we honestly say that a 30-member “Global Counterterrorism Forum”—comprising the
AU member countries of Nigeria; South Africa; Egypt; Algeria; and Mauritania –
would be the solution to countering violent extremism in the problem of the
Sahel; Horn of Africa; and South East Asia. To have Algeria in that group is
encouraging as that country has given vent to what observers of the AU in some
quarters call the “maghrebization of peace and security” of the AU.
I take issue not so much with the
fact that this is an initiative of the Obama administration, but that the UN,
regional and sub-regional bodies “would be invited to participate in the
appropriate working group and their activities”. As to why they are not a
permanent feature remains unclear. In the long run, this forum will be
inaugurated on 21 September on the sidelines of the UN general assembly in New
York.
Conclusion
I have no illusions that most of
what I write here will be read by a minority of Ghanaians at best, minority of
Africans at worst, and inculcated in a way that will help them make
viscerally-life-changing decisions about what they can do to help the AU and
ECOWAS deliver for citizens.
What I do know is that someone
somewhere will take note and seek to educate themselves about the AU and ECOWAS
–despite the absolutely egregious manner in which these two organizations
project themselves to African citizens.
What I also know is that until
Ghanaians begin to lose themselves to the rhythm of the African integration
march, they will consign their progeny to an inexcusable fate they could have
avoided. African integration will not work without a concerted effort by
all—citizens and especially media alike—holding the policy-makers of these
groupings accountable.
Much of the time, citizens are
keen to work for them because of the good money that is offered, forgetting
that the benefits and good salary are the bonus of hard work in helping make a
contribution towards the betterment of generations unborn.
As I write this in the aftermath
of another successful GJA Media Awards, I cannot help but also bow my head down
in shame on how despite the centrality of Ghana in African integration—thanks
to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah—Ghanaian media practitioners seem to be waiting for some
external actor to sponsor an AU reporting award before they start writing about
the AU or ECOWAS! Where is civil society on this issue? Where, indeed, are the
media practitioners who need to be asking why such an award is not part of the
categories?
Ghana is much more than the
politicking of the NPP and NDC, and I daresay we do not have to wait for the
CPP to emerge as a fully-fledged third force before we start talking, and
taking seriously what the AU and ECOWAS do. The triple responsibility that
Ghanaians bear of being citizens of Ghana, ECOWAS community citizens and AUfrican
citizens ought to awaken them to the imperative and necessity of capitalizing
on both the months of May and September
to give vent to the AUfrican personality the continent so desperately needs.
ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org
In
2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42nd
Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the
role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel
owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative
to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration
initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration
initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: 0268.687.653.
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
Over Libya, Pax Nigeriana has Failed ECOWAS
“The Accidental Ecowas
& AU Citizen”:
Over
Libya, Pax Nigeriana has Failed
ECOWAS
By E.K.Bensah Jr
The inchoate crystallization of a Pax Nigeriana is in serious danger of foundering.
In 2011, Nigeria has had and enjoyed the
priviledge of sitting both on the UN Security and AU Peace and Security Council
-- as well as heading the chair of ECOWAS. At the Pan-African and global level,
its performance has been questionable.
Instead of using the opportunity to demonstrate leadership for sub-Saharan Africa, it has given into its solipsistic whims, exposing the country less as a leader and more of a filibusterer. This thoughtless itch to go it alone has probably endangered not just the Nigerian Diaspora but other West Africans worldwide. Here's why:
First, to many observers and neophytes of ECOWAS alike, Nigeria seems to be synonymous with Ecowas. During the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, many Westerners reporting the crisis gave the impression it was led by ECOWAS, using tags like “Nigeria-led” ECOWAS. A piece by bloggers of the academic blog “The Westphalian Post” of 2 January, 2011[1] even went as far as writing this of ECOWAS:
Instead of using the opportunity to demonstrate leadership for sub-Saharan Africa, it has given into its solipsistic whims, exposing the country less as a leader and more of a filibusterer. This thoughtless itch to go it alone has probably endangered not just the Nigerian Diaspora but other West Africans worldwide. Here's why:
First, to many observers and neophytes of ECOWAS alike, Nigeria seems to be synonymous with Ecowas. During the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, many Westerners reporting the crisis gave the impression it was led by ECOWAS, using tags like “Nigeria-led” ECOWAS. A piece by bloggers of the academic blog “The Westphalian Post” of 2 January, 2011[1] even went as far as writing this of ECOWAS:
“With France, Britain, the US and the EU preparing sanctions packages
against Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria led ECOWAS [sic] threatening to mobilise the ECOMOG against
Yamoussoukro, the loyalty of the army and Gbagbo’s apparatchiks may not last
longer. Add to this ECOWAS’s decision to stop printing money for Côte d’Ivoire
and the regime has its days numbered.”
Never mind the impression created
that ECOWAS is “led” by Nigeria, and that the defunct ECOMOG mission of the
nineties exists, but to even confuse ECOWAS with UEMOA (which was really the
regional economic union that ensured bank notes had been stopped) speaks of a
breath-taking ignorance of ECOWAS and its mandate by much of the West.
Second, at a continental level, Nigeria's recognition of rebels has
both endangered the sub-region and unwittingly irked the AU. Although some
African countries have recognized the rebels, the AU officially has not. In
addition, despite the fact that Nigeria refused to attend the Paris conference
“welcoming” the TNC to the international community, as it were, lending some
credence to an independent stance, few can deny how much Nigeria's stance looks
pro-Nato and pro-West.
Third, far be it for anyone to assume that from Ghana we know what is going on on Nigeria’s domestic front as far as security is concerned, but there’s no gainsaying that while Nigeria must be lauded for wanting to open communication channels with Boko Haram, the extent to which it was successful has been demonstrated with the bombing of the UN building on 24 August.
Third, far be it for anyone to assume that from Ghana we know what is going on on Nigeria’s domestic front as far as security is concerned, but there’s no gainsaying that while Nigeria must be lauded for wanting to open communication channels with Boko Haram, the extent to which it was successful has been demonstrated with the bombing of the UN building on 24 August.
The very incisive journalists in
the Nigerian media must have written many column inches about it; I wonder
whether—in fact I can confirm—most of my Ghanaian compatriots did not
countenance sufficient cogitation over the issue to warrant discussion in the
press through feature articles, for example, over the usual politicking.
In my view, whether Boko Haram is
a domestic Islamic sect or not, that they exist is one existence of a sect too
many, and too close to Ghana—not to mention a significant and nettlesome hindrance
to the peace and security efforts being promoted by ECOWAS since it revised its
treaty in 1993—not to merit consideration and attention by media practitioners
in the sub-region.
In this case, Ghana could have
capitalized on what some ECOWAS neighbours believe to be Ghana’s “arrogance” of
feeling it to be the beacon of stability in the sub-region to join hands with
its bigger neighbor in Nigeria to reflect on the ramifications of Boko Haram on
the peace and stability of the sub-region. No-one need be told that the
sub-region is both volatile and explosive, what with an abundance of natural
resources, including Black Gold, coupled with our ever-porous borders.
These sparks ought to have been
sufficient for Nigeria to have read between the lines, reflected also on the 17
June bombing, considered the many meetings of the INTERPOL-supported West
African Police Chiefs Committee Organisation (WAPCCO) between June and August,
and decided to get serious on encouraging and lobbying fellow West African
countries to ratify the 2005 protocol establishing the Criminal Investigative Intelligence
Bureau(CIIB).
That Guinea-Conakry is the only
ECOWAS member state to have established one at the local level ought to have
given Nigeria fodder to begin lobbying that francophone neighbor into offering
best practices for a possible model for the sub-region.
Meanwhile, Ghana does not -- and
ought not – to escape finger-pointing here, for it was the country that
recommended at Abidjan in 2002[2] at
what would have been a meeting of WAPCCO that ECOWAS should be endowed with an
FBI/INTERPOL-like intelligence system for ECOWAS to deal with cross-border crime.
Since 2005, when the proposal for it was included in an ECOWAS Political
Declaration, Ghana seems to have kept
mute on the issue – as if it is neither important nor necessitates reflection
on given our equally-porous border we share with Cote d’Ivoire and the
attendant security issues we experience.
Fourth, what the Nigerian Daily Trust calls the country’s decision
to “re-formulate [its] foreign policy to
reflect current global realities” is suspicious at best, dangerous at
worst. Even if we forget it only goes to reinforce views of Nigerian’s
surprising and remarkable volte-face, it has given Nigeria unwanted attention
in an era where “terrorism” can be formulated into a convenient answer to
intractable problems.
The Daily Trust’s editorial of 2 September is not without bite. It
criticizes Nigeria for thoughtlessness, arguing that “to play [a] leadership role effectively, Nigeria’s leaders must be
ready to think things through before they take any action on behalf of its
people and on behalf of the peoples and countries of Africa.” Considering how countries in the sub-region
are concerned about the spillover of the Libyan conflict, the point about how
Nigeria’s thoughtless act somehow endangering the sub-region can therefore not
be sneezed at.
In the final analysis, no matter
what Nigeria tries to do to save face, history is likely to judge it harshly.
The opportunity lost to show leadership at a historic time when that country sits
on the Councils of what are arguably two of the most prestigious international gathering
on peace and security alongside South Africa, and to have the latter steal the
thunder of Nigeria by offering a principled stance by not recognizing the
rebels of Libya could certainly be conceived of as the beginning of the
breakdown of any assumption of a Pax
Nigeriana—and all the attendant respect that comes with such a status.
ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org
In
2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42nd
Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the
role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel
owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org).
Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on
global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog
features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many
others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net
/ Mobile: 0268.687.653.
Tuesday, September 6, 2011
Why “Africa” is Lost in the “Abuja Treaty” Translation
“The Accidental Ecowas
& AU Citizen”:
Why
“Africa” is Lost in the “Abuja Treaty” Translation
By E.K.Bensah Jr
There's a
conspicuously delicious irony centred around Nigeria in African integration
history: it's to do with the fact that despite that country's “gradualist”
pretensions to African unity, it's capital city is an eponymous representation
to what is perhaps the most ambitious project to unite Africa--the Abuja
Treaty.
Signed in May 1991, it has been in operation since June 1994. But many Africans
wouldn't know it, for despite efforts by the AU to operationalise it, it is
perhaps the best-kept open secret in Africa--as perhaps are the regional
economic communities(RECs)!
Abuja Treaty vs AEC
and RECs
The Treaty establishing
the African Economic Community(AEC) was signed in Abuja, Nigeria in 1991. The
AEC offers a framework for continental integration. The RECS are mere
building blocs towards the full realisation of the AEC.
As regards the AEC, it has set no less than SIX stages to be fully
operational. Starting from 1994, it has allowed 34 years for FULL
political and economic integration. That makes 2018/2019 an important
year. So, if we're
lucky, by 2020, the African Economic Community should be fully operational,
with the eight AU-recognised RECs(AU-RECs) possibly subsumed under
regions of North, Central, East, South and West African Economic Communities.
I believe the reality to be very different by 2020. As RECs gain prestige in
their comparative advantages of peace/conflict management; infrastructure, etc,
they are wont to maintain themselves as legal personalities in their own
right, and not necessarily want to subsume their staff and competencies under
one sub-regional economic community!
If what Ghanaian lawyer and academic Dr.Richard Frimpong Oppong says is
anything to go by in his insightful March 2010 piece "The
African Union, the African Economic Community and Africa's Regional Economic Communities",
given that the African Economic Community does not have a legal personality--that
is to say that it has rights, protections, privileges, responsibilities, and
liabilities under law, just as natural persons (humans) do--it already makes
the framework upon which the African Union operates rather shaky and tenuous.
This is because while there is a protocol establishing the relationship between
the AEC and RECs, "to what extent are the RECs bound by decisions of
the AEC? Since the RECs, which have their own legal personality, are not
parties to the AEC Treaty, what is the legal basis for assuming that they will
merge and form the African Economic Community?"[italics are that of
Dr.Oppong in his piece on p.94]
In my opinion, this is the crux of his piece--and a very important one at that
too. Even more important is "rationalising", if you will, the
relationship between the AEC and RECs as they progress and advance in their
development. This other important point ought not to be lost on as we
cogitate over the future of African integration and where the AU is going.
In my view, Dr.Oppong has opened up a whole new can of worms around African
integration, and one which, in the light of the challenges the AU has been
going through this year with Libya, merits serious consideration.
Pax
Nigeriana
The specific case of
Africa being “lost in the Abuja Treaty translation” is two-fold: one is
historical; and the other has to do with the kind of vilification Nigeria goes
through every now and then over its governance.
History shows us that
Nigeria’s vision of continental union was not always as progressive as it has
been made out to be. Long before the then-OAU was established in May 1963,
Nigeria was all too happy being part of the so-called 24-member “Monrovia”
group, which were more conservative and gradualist about how Africa should be
united. Comprising Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Cameroon—among
many other countries—they were opposed to the “big-bang” integration advocated
by the more radical members of the six-member Casablanca group, which included
Ghana; Guinea; Mali; Egypt and Morocco.
It is ironic therefore
that both the abortive Lagos Plan of Action and the Abuja Treaty would all be
done in the most populous Black African country.
Secondly, despite the fact
that corruption and/or chaos have been by-words of that country, we cannot
escape the fact that, like Brussels being synonymous with the European Union
institutions, Abuja is also increasingly a by-word for West Africa’s regional
grouping of ECOWAS and its institutions.
As we now know, it is even
more: Abuja has not just played host to a number of important meetings on
Africa, its governance, and its integration throughout the years, but also has
an important document outlining continental integration named after the capital
city. Additionally, even if it was the Treaty of Lagos that set up ECOWAS in
1975, it is now in Abuja that many diplomatic missions worldwide flock to get
closer to what has been termed in some quarters as Africa’s most dynamic
regional economic community this side of the Sahara. Add the fact that Abuja is
set to host the third pillar of the Pan-African financial institution—the
African Central Bank—and we have for ourselves an “African Brussels” to watch
out for.
The extent to which we—as
African Union community citizens—can accept the double-edged sword of Nigeria
both as a great country that is flawed and tainted by corruption, but one that
will inevitably play critical roles in the facilitation of continental union
will largely depend on how truly committed we all are to seeing an Africa
predicated on strong, sustainable, effective and credible institutions that are
funded by Africans – for the benefit of the continent.
ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org
from: http://www.thebftonline.com/bft_subcat_linkdetails.cfm?prodcatID=6&tblNewsCatID=63&tblNewsID=9224
In
2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42nd
Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the
role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel
owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org).
Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on
global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog
features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many
others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net
/ Mobile: 0268.687.653.
Monday, August 29, 2011
What Kwame Nkrumah Said about African Unity -- Take Note!
"The ultimate goal of a united States of Africa must be kept constantly in sight amidst all the perplexities, pressures and cajoleries with which we shall find ourselves confronted so that we do not permit ourselves to be distracted or discouraged by the difficulties and pitfalls,which undoubtedly lie ahead" -Kwame Nkrumah, "Africa must Unite", p.143
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
The African Union's "Situation Room" Compared to the EU's newly-created "Situation Room"
Back in March this year, when I had the opportunity to also visit the AU's situation room, alongside then-colleagues of the Africa Peace and Security programme(APSP), I had to say I was impressed by this very screen here [this picture is from Derek Henry Flood of http://the-war-diaries.com/?tag=new-african-union], which I also remarked, but felt it was not possible to take a picture of! I would have thought that the AU Situation Room might want to keep it confidential you know!
Anyway, the point ought not to be lost on you that the AU Situation Room has been around for a while--in fact since 1998--and I want to cull what I found from an AU report:
"
59. Ambassador Ki-Doulaye gave a brief overview of the Situation Room of the Conflict Management Center. He pointed out that after the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution in 1993, with the Central Organ as its main decision-making body, there grew an increasing need to understand African conflicts better, in order to prevent them. It was commonsensical at that time that a thorough understanding of African conflicts required timely and reliable information and analysis, providing the decision-makers with actionable options. These growing concerns provided the impetus for convening, in 1998, of the meeting of experts to identify the political, economic, social, and military indicators, which could be considered to qualify a conflict.
60. The Acting Head of the CMC informed the experts that it was following the outcome of that meeting in 1998, that the Situation Room was established, to serve as an initial step to the establishment within the CMC of a full continental early warning unit, which would strengthen the capacity of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Situation Room is now serving as the center for the collection, processing and dissemination of data and information on crisis situations around the continent.
61. In addition, Ms. Coleman, Head of the Early Warning Unit, underscored the fact that the Situation Room is aiming at establishing focal points and linkages with Regional Mechanisms, and that, currently, it has established its own formal and informal networks with civil society organizations, academic and research institutions, the United Nations and other international organizations. She further explained that the Situation Room monitors developments in all 53 African countries, though much attention is given to zones of conflicts, post-conflicts and potential conflicts.
62. With regard to the methodology of collecting and processing data and information, Ms. Coleman noted that the main source of information comes from the public domain in hard and soft prints, including newspaper both private and public, satellite TV channels, electronic news sites, and from informal sources on the ground. She explained that the information gathered is processed and compiled in the form of "News Briefs," which is forwarded to the authorities three times a day and are posted and circulated through the intranet for all staff of the Organization
63. In conclusion, she pointed out some of the challenges facing the Situation Room and the Early warning Unit as a whole. In terms of human resources, she drew attention to the fact that there are only two professional staff in the Early Warning Unit, which poses a serious challenge to meet the demands and workload of the Unit. She added that with only 6 assistants, it has been an extra challenge for the Situation Room to function as expected and that many of the staff and assistants are stretched to the limit to perform the vital tasks of the Unit. She also mentioned the need for technical equipment, including enough computers for the staff and the software tool, to facilitate data collection, processing and analysis.
59. Ambassador Ki-Doulaye gave a brief overview of the Situation Room of the Conflict Management Center. He pointed out that after the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution in 1993, with the Central Organ as its main decision-making body, there grew an increasing need to understand African conflicts better, in order to prevent them. It was commonsensical at that time that a thorough understanding of African conflicts required timely and reliable information and analysis, providing the decision-makers with actionable options. These growing concerns provided the impetus for convening, in 1998, of the meeting of experts to identify the political, economic, social, and military indicators, which could be considered to qualify a conflict.
60. The Acting Head of the CMC informed the experts that it was following the outcome of that meeting in 1998, that the Situation Room was established, to serve as an initial step to the establishment within the CMC of a full continental early warning unit, which would strengthen the capacity of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Situation Room is now serving as the center for the collection, processing and dissemination of data and information on crisis situations around the continent.
61. In addition, Ms. Coleman, Head of the Early Warning Unit, underscored the fact that the Situation Room is aiming at establishing focal points and linkages with Regional Mechanisms, and that, currently, it has established its own formal and informal networks with civil society organizations, academic and research institutions, the United Nations and other international organizations. She further explained that the Situation Room monitors developments in all 53 African countries, though much attention is given to zones of conflicts, post-conflicts and potential conflicts.
62. With regard to the methodology of collecting and processing data and information, Ms. Coleman noted that the main source of information comes from the public domain in hard and soft prints, including newspaper both private and public, satellite TV channels, electronic news sites, and from informal sources on the ground. She explained that the information gathered is processed and compiled in the form of "News Briefs," which is forwarded to the authorities three times a day and are posted and circulated through the intranet for all staff of the Organization
63. In conclusion, she pointed out some of the challenges facing the Situation Room and the Early warning Unit as a whole. In terms of human resources, she drew attention to the fact that there are only two professional staff in the Early Warning Unit, which poses a serious challenge to meet the demands and workload of the Unit. She added that with only 6 assistants, it has been an extra challenge for the Situation Room to function as expected and that many of the staff and assistants are stretched to the limit to perform the vital tasks of the Unit. She also mentioned the need for technical equipment, including enough computers for the staff and the software tool, to facilitate data collection, processing and analysis." --from: http://www.google.com.gh/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=13&ved=0CCEQFjACOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.africa-union.org%2Froot%2Fua%2FConferences%2Fdecembre%2FPSC%2F17-19%2520dec%2FRpt%252030-31Oct%2520%252003%2520Background%2520n%25201.doc&rct=j&q=%22AU%20situation%20room%22&ei=M6UuTtq_LojIhAeb6_Uj&usg=AFQjCNF9Pg_NkCkfxXYpRHNsXTrjiqH3Gw&cad=rja
A bit too long, but I guess you get the point that to read that -- and then to read the latest news over the weekend that no less than the European Union was establishing an EU "Situation Room" under the new External European Action Service(EEAS) could only prompt questions as to whether the EU might have copied the AU--but never admit it! Let's see the dates: 1998 and 2011. Some 13 years down the line? I do not think anyone can convince me that the bilaterals that have taken place over the years between the AU and the EU Commissions might have touched on peace and security and, by extension, the situation rooms!
Check the objectives for the EU Situation room and you might get the picture:
----------------------------------
The EU Situation Room is part of the EEAS Crisis Response Department. It is operational since 15 July 2011.
The main tasks of the EU Situation Room are the following:
The key words are "similar crisis mechanisms" -- and frankly, the EU, you weren't original this time!!
ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org
A bit too long, but I guess you get the point that to read that -- and then to read the latest news over the weekend that no less than the European Union was establishing an EU "Situation Room" under the new External European Action Service(EEAS) could only prompt questions as to whether the EU might have copied the AU--but never admit it! Let's see the dates: 1998 and 2011. Some 13 years down the line? I do not think anyone can convince me that the bilaterals that have taken place over the years between the AU and the EU Commissions might have touched on peace and security and, by extension, the situation rooms!
Check the objectives for the EU Situation room and you might get the picture:
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The EU Situation Room is part of the EEAS Crisis Response Department. It is operational since 15 July 2011.
The main tasks of the EU Situation Room are the following:
- To lead, manage and develop all EEAS permanence and situational awareness capabilities;
- To staff and support the EEAS Crisis Platform;
- To ensure that all EEAS services can continuously have access to accurate and updated situational awareness as regards the political situation worldwide, the particular situations affecting EU Delegations and EU CSDP Missions/Operations as well as events and situations potentially affecting EEAS staff from a duty-of-care perspective;
- To manage and develop relations with similar crisis mechanisms in certain International Organisations and a number of third countries.
The key words are "similar crisis mechanisms" -- and frankly, the EU, you weren't original this time!!
ekbensah AT critiquing-regionalism.org
Monday, July 18, 2011
I have been on Google Plus for the past week...
 | I have been on Google Plus for the past week or so, and am loving it. Though it has been a while since I posted something in the AU citizen blog, you can rest assured that Google Plus is certainly and definitely helping me bring you the best possible entries. I am currently reading the AU's Minimum Integration Programme(2009), alongside many critical information by the UN's Economic Commission for Africa. I have yet to find as many valuable pieces by the African Development Bank(AfDb). I am also compiling information for a G+ account on "African Integration", which one can access by clicking this link: http://gplus.to/Afri See you there!  African Integration Watch - Google+African Integration Watch - Sources on emerging African Integration efforts by African Union / UNECA / AfDB - - - Just a passionate West African political scientist working in the non-profit sector,...  The Google+ project is currently working out all the kinks with a small group of testers. If you're not able to access Google+, please check again soon. Learn more about Google+ |
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