Enter the Chad Dragon in the ECOWAS-CENSAD region!

Back in October 2011, my piece “Hot Issues on the AU needing popular advocacy (I) – or Travelling Cheaply in Africa, & Southern Sudan” touched briefly on CENSAD. I started off with a history of CENSAD, going on to ask the way forward.

The Community of Sahel-Saharan States was established in 1998 by the late Colonel Qaddafi. After the rationalization of the regional economic communities in 2006, it became an AU-REC – that is one of the eight RECs mandated and recognized by the African Union. It has twenty-eight members, and Ghana is a member.

Despite many meetings that had taken place and a then-fully-functioning website on http://www.censad.org, the uprising that started in Libya in March threw a huge spanner in the works of the organisation, effectively throwing the regional grouping out of sync with the other RECs at its base in Tripoli. Regrettably, the conspicuous absence of the African Union itself on the future of CENSAD has not helped dispel the notion that the AU is nothing more than a “toothless” bulldog.

The passing of Qaddafi, I intoned, has effectively taken the wind out of the sails of CENSAD, probably throwing all the good work – including the Great Green Wall being built along the sub-region to protect the region from climate change; as well as the establishment of a free-trade area of ECOWAS-UEMOA-CENSAD/ECOWAS-CENSAD/ECCAS along the likes of the SADC-COMESA-EAC tripartite free trade area, which was mooted in 2008.

Going forward, I would expect to see the AU taking serious the need to engage the National Transitional Council in Libya on their commitments to the African Union. This would include discussions on Libya and where it stands on the establishment of the AU-mandated and Tripoli-hosted African Investment Bank, as well as the state of play of CEN-SAD, and how it can be factored into discussions of Africa’s ongoing discussions over Africa’s integration.

In January 2013, an organisation by the name of Centre 4S, which is based in Morocco, and which researches defence and security in the Sahelo-Saharian band /strip; armed violence and terrorism, among other subjects, released a paper in French entitled “Revitaliser le CENSAD”, or reinvigorating CENSAD.

The main idea of the paper is to look at the critical role CENSAD can play in the Sahel; ways in which cooperation and synergy can be created around the zone, and ways in which there can be strengthened cross-border cooperation.

Truth be told, the uniqueness of CENSAD is in its ability to merge ECOWAS; Arab Maghreb Union and ECCASS countries together. The article maintains that the contribution that CENSAD offers its member states ought to be re-examined. Furthermore, the crisis in Mali has set an important precedent for the member states to really get serious on what can be done to use the body as a tool for securing the region politically and diplomatically.

The paper states that “CENSAD should present itself as an institutional and diplomatic framework, of unity and action, capable of formulating a pertinent response, inclusive and varied, to current security challenges.” Even more important for a reinvigorated and re-launched CENSAD should be the aspiration to complement ECOWAS and the Arab Maghreb Union, especially as they are two RECs most-familiar with the security deficits of the Sahel region. These efforts will “equally allow for a better coherence and coordination of different initiatives on the Sahel”, such as Algeria’s Joint Military Command with Mali; Niger; and Mauritania.

Chad rising, Chad in ECOWAS?

Chad is a Central African country and a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Some wonder why it should not also become a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) According to one Elvis Kodjo, writing in fratmat.info, 'although the idea has not been officially announced, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moussa Mahamat Dago indicated on 19 January 2012 in Abidjan during a celebration of Chad's 50th anniversary that the issue was currently being considered.”

The idea for joining rests with the fact that Chad has emerged from several decades of unrest, and understands “more than any other African country that “African integration is necessary for its development”.

The fact is that since the start of oil production in 2005, “Chad has become the ninth largest African oil producer and has improved its network of roads, which has expanded from 200 to more than 3 000 km. Plans for a new, ultramodern airport are underway, and a railroad linking the country to Cameroon will soon be constructed”. Kodjo maintains that “while being a veritable construction site, Chad also has forty million hectors of arable land”.

In order to encourage the effective use of this land, the Ministry Of Foreign Affairs spokesman Mahamat has said that the country “has equipped itself with a particularly attractive investment code” and is looking to secure the best opportunities for itself by diversifying its economic partners in both Central and West Africa.

In March 2011, Chad was, in fact, granted observer status of ECOWAS and my monitoring of Chad's wooing suggests that Chadian President Idris Deby is still keen on sweet-talking Jonathon—in his capacity as leader of the regional hegemon, Nigeria—to accept Chad as a full member of ECOWAS. In April 2012, I was quick to speculate that it is unlikely to happen soon, given the instability in the Sahel region and the headaches of Mali and Guinea-Bissau. All that can be said for now is for observers to keep a keen eye on Chad making “incursions” into ECOWAS sooner than later.

Then Mali happens. And suddenly, we are confronted with a Chad that is offering support to the Africa-led support mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the tune of around 3000 troops, which is around a third of what all ECOWAS troops have offered.

One of the reasons why Chad is an important country to look out for is for what happened on Saturday 16 February when Chad’s president Idris Deby hosted some eleven leaders of the CENSAD regional economic community that was established in 1998. The capital N’djamena played host to what should have been 20 members of the populous grouping. Even if a little over a third of the Heads of State showed up, it was encouraging to see that the 17 other member states dispatched representatives. Furthermore, it has shown that the raison d’être for the establishment of the grouping might still be relevant.

Some of the major outcomes include a revision of the Charter, to reflect the fact that the organisation is interested in two major things: peace and security; and sustainable development. Two permanent organs will be established to this end, and Egypt is likely to host the peace and security organ.

As this is a developing story, with much of the material in French, watch this space over the next couple of weeks when the implications of a rising Chad will begin to unfold. For what it is worth, CENSAD’s next meeting will be in Morocco, which is itself making overtures to re-join the African Union.

In April 2012, I wrote of how there is talk of an ECCAS-ECOWAS-CENSAD free trade area along the likes of the Tripartite FTA (T-FTA) of SADC-COMESA-EAC that was mooted in 2008. With Central Africa only last week meeting and seeking concretely to rationalise its programmes for ECCAS and CEMAC to harmonise and merge, it is really exciting times for African integration!

ENDs

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: +233.268.687.653.

Communicating the ECOWAS Message (2)...in Mali: Time for Permanent ECOWAS and AU missions over Africa!

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

Communicating the ECOWAS Message (2)...in Mali: Time for Permanent ECOWAS and AU missions over Africa!

By E.K.Bensah Jr

 By the time you read this, it would have been more than 48 hours since a counter-coup in the West African state of Guinea-Bissau. It would have been some 96 hours since ECOWAS met up with the African Union, the European Union, the United Nations and other stakeholders in Mali to make take decisive steps for an intervention in Mali.

In all this, one wonders what the AU message has been. Considering the fact that the AU is the superintendent of the African Standby Force (under which there are regional nodes, such as the Ecowas standby force currently in Guinea-Bissau), why has it not been seen to be articulating the message that any troops from Ecowas would be under the umbrella of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), under which the African Standby Force is a direct outcome.

And what of Ecowas? Where is Sunny Ugoh, the Communications Director of Ecowas? Unlike Nato and the EU, I am yet to see a spokesperson for the Ecowas Commission. Even at the African Union, the Deputy President Erastus Mwencha acts like the unofficial spokesperson of the President-proper. While it is true that the Vice-President of Ecowas has been a bit more visible than his francophone predecessor, we probably cannot point the finger of blame to him on why Ecowas has arguably failed in communicating its message over Mali.

I am keen to avoid an elaboration of the timeline that led us to what might be an ineluctable slide to intervention in the northern part of Mali. All I would need to say is that had Mali not taken the matter to the United Nations to seek Chapter VII-approval, an Ecowas standby force (ESF) might just be in that country now and Malians would have probably felt less trepidation about an eventual intervention.

If the penny has yet to drop on the point I am making, then let me make it very crystal-clear: like in the Ivorian crisis, and Libya in 2011, both Ecowas and the AU have failed woefully to communicate yet-again on what kind of policy is directing them in their decisions in Mali—never mind Guinea-Bissau, which has just experienced a counter-coup and will need Ecowas leadership to show the way.

Liberia in 1990  vs Mali in 2012

In order to get a sense of why communication has failed, we need to return to history.

As you may well now know, Ecowas broke out onto the stage in 1990 when it went into Liberia under ECOMOG. Its intervention happened at a time when there was fatigue by the so-called international community on Africa. There was no Chapter VII-approval before intervention as the UN itself was playing a wait-and-watch game. Despite the fact that the United States was Liberia's biggest Western ally, not once did the US step into offer its assistance as explicitly as it has done in the case of Mali. Instead, intervention was left to the English-speaking countries of Ecowas to spearhead. It must be noted the francophones were very uneasy about intervening in Liberia, and, frankly, they feared Nigeria as well.

According to one Comfort Ero, currently  Crisis Group's Nairobi-based Africa Program Director since January 2011, who has written extensively on ECOMOG in Liberia as well as peace and security in West Africa,  there are three reasons why Ecowas went into Liberia.

First of all, ECOWAS believed that "regional instability was inevitable due to the overflow and displacement of refugees in neighbouring countries." Consequently, there was a fear that the conflict would trigger lateral pressure to such an extent that refugees would feel compelled to spill over into neighbouring countries, such as Sierra-Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast.

Secondly, ECOWAS went in purely for humanitarian reasons. According to Ero, "in its Final Communiqué, the Standing Committee gave a strongly humanitarian rationale for its decisions, {to that effect} adding that presently, there is a government in Liberia which cannot govern contending factions which are holding the entire population as hostages depriving them of food, health facilities and other basic necessities of life." Moreover, an ECOWAS statement in August 1990 was more "explicit in emphasizing a humanitarian objective.” In it, it stated that there needed to be a "stopping {of} the senseless killing of innocent civilians, nationals and foreigners, and to help the Liberian people to restore their democratic institutions."

Finally, justification for intervention was predicated on the 1981 ECOWAS Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence. According to Article 16 of the Protocol, "the Head of State of a member country under attack may request action or assistance from the community."

Twenty-two years later, there seems to be fudge because, it seems, Mali has not had sufficient faith in its own sub-regional institutions. Guinea-Bissau seemed quite happy to allow an Ecowas Standby Force—much to the chagrin of the Lisbon-based Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP)--into the country to replace the UN troops in May 2012. Even with Guinea-Bissau, Lisbon saw itself as needing to be seen to be playing a critical role in the resolution of the crisis. 

Weeks before the 30 May withdrawal of Angolan troops, Portugal claimed that the CPLP reserves the right to call for intervention from the Security Council. This, in my view, seemed to reflect a more stylistic approach to any resolution of the crisis in Guinea-Bissau than substance, for whether Portugal likes it or not, the former remains a member of ECOWAS, and it is that bloc that is and was that bloc that was likely to power-broker any solution to the coup!

Back in May, the Pan-African News Agency (PANA) reported that Burkina Faso would become the first troop contributing nation to deploy to the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) when the first batch of its 170-member Formed Police Unit (FPU) landed in Bissau. It continued that apart from Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Togo were also expected to contribute to the 629-strong regional force, which would replace Angolan troops.

As the Angolan security mission in Guinea-Bissau agreed to fully-withdraw by 30 May, ECOWAS defence chiefs ended their one-day meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, Monday 14 May with an agreement to begin the deployment Friday 18 May 2012.

Among its functions, ECOMIB will seek to support the restoration of constitutional rule, provide security for VIPs and guarantee the freedom of movement of humanitarian agencies in the country, ahead of the planned Security Sector Reform in that country.

MICEMA vs ECOMIB

At this stage, it is premature to do a direct compare-and-contrast of the Ecowas Mission to Mali (Mission de la CEDEAO au Mali), and it is encouraging that there is already a mission in the formation. I want to discourage a finger-pointing at Ecowas; instead I would want to know why Mali did not espouse sufficient confidence in Ecowas, especially at a time when there were reports of Malians calling for Ecowas intervention. The questions I am seeking are unlikely to be answered in the here and now, so one might just have to settle for the historians to do the speculation—wherever West African historians and political scientists may be!

What I do know is this: following the meeting in Mali of 19 October, the UN and AU have both decided to establish permanent missions in Mali in order to coordinate developments around an eventual intervention. I would like to think that Ecowas might consider establishing a permanent mission there, as well, in the way the AU has established AMISOM in Somalia.

In the meantime, here are my humble proposals for Ecowas to move forward in attempts at communication.

Recommendations for ECOWAS

First, ECOWAS should re-configure its ECOWAS National Units into permanent missions and reduce the fiction that they are liaising with the public. Even if they never intended to do that, it should have been one of their aims: serve as the link between the ECOWAS institutions and its community citizens. In Ghana, they are a desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.

Ecowas has sufficient internally-generated funds to be able to afford establishing a mission in every Ecowas member state. If the AU can establish a permanent mission in Brussels (which is regrettably largely-funded by the EU!), then it should be able to also establish missions in at least “strategic” AU countries.

Failing that, the ECOWAS National Units should establish a website, and regularly-provide citizens information on what Ecowas is doing. Few people have sufficient time to be checking the website of ECOWAS every day. The Ecowas National Unit should be bringing Ecowas to community citizens, and not expecting us as citizens to find out what they are doing. Simply put, they must be accountable. And in this era of New and Social Media, Ecowas should hurry up and re-design its website so that everything on their site can be shared to an Ecowas page on Facebook. Even the AU is beginning to appreciate the necessity of being on Facebook and Twitter. Ecowas must do same quickly or face continuing to be considered an irrelevant institution by a large part of its community citizens!

Direct action!

As a direct outcome of last week’s article, a journalist from the Global Media Alliance-sponsored ETV Ghana, Fred Smith, decided to establish a group on the whatsapp social networking site to enable interested media practitioners, journalists, and communicators work together to promote the idea of an Africa press wire service here in Ghana. While some exist already through PANAPRESS and the Africa Press Organisation, no such organisation exists in Ghana. For a country which first President promulgated Pan-Africanism, is regrettable to say the least! Interested parties can contact me directly. The list-serv to carry this idea forward can be found on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ghanapressclub4africa

ENDs 

Mission: ECOWAS Has a Responsibility to Protect West Africa from Criminals

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

Mission: ECOWAS Has a Responsibility to Protect West Africa from Criminals

E.K.Bensah Jr

Back in October 2011, I wrote a piece entitled “Time for ECOWAS to Ratify the Criminal Investigative Intelligence Bureau”. The idea behind the piece was to argue that free movement is great for the ECOWAS sub-region, but comes at a cost – cross-border crime. The news last week of West African “aliens” having been caught entering Ghana to benefit from National Health Insurance is but one of many stories of how free movement for ECOWAS citizens, including the provision to stay ninety days in a country, can be abused. This provision is possible thanks to the Protocol on Free Movement, Right of Residence and Establishment which was adopted in 1979. In 1980, ECOWAS members would ratify the first phase of the Protocol guaranteeing free entry of citizens from member states without visa for ninety days.

I also touched on how West African leaders, working through ECOWAS, had made significant strides on combating drug trafficking, crime; and what I described as “all the attendant vices associated with un-policed porous borders”

With UEMOA (comprising eight francophone ECOWAS member states) using ID cards and all ECOWAS member states having adopted national ID systems, the window of opportunity must be capitalised upon by member states to really get serious in securing a sub-region. Although hope springs eternal on this continent, we cannot live on it indefinitely – simply because it is unsustainable in terms of deliverables. With specific case to the ID cards, this means that every single Ghanaian ought to enjoy usage of the national ID cards—and not just a select few who have received their cards. The cards ought to be used by banks and nation-wide institutions. When done, this will help in building a database of citizens, which will also help law enforcement agencies to liaise nationally and sub-regionally.

Equally important in my argument was how in October 2008, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime launched a report[1] that “castigated ECOWAS member states for their apparently-lackadaisical approach to fighting trans-border crime in the sub-region”. Member states like Guinea-Bissau had become soft spots for drug traffickers who took advantage of often-corrupt systems of governance to use that country as a conduit for onward movement of their drugs.

Regrettably, even as Guinea-Bisssau is voting in elections at the time of writing, and no less than 180 ECOWAS election observers are in the country, it cannot shake off the tag of the “narco-state”, which has ineluctably been associated it.

How ECOWAS has positively changed the landscape

Almost four years later, the situation continues to change dramatically as ECOWAS member states have gotten serious by engaging the UN Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC) and other UN agencies, such as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to establish elite and so-called “Transnational Crime Units” in selected ECOWAS member states[2] to deal with the canker under the West African Coastal Initiative.

At the sub-regional level, ECOWAS has a number of structures that are helping rein in what might otherwise be a chaotic sub-region. These include the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drugs trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse[3]; ECOWAS Committees of Chiefs of Security Services, and Chiefs of Defence Staff; WAPCCO; and GIABA.

Backed by the Canada-based “The Pearson Peacekeeping Centre”, the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Security Services has assisted ECOWAS since May 2009 to create a committee that ensures proper communication and coordination efforts with member states on the police component of the African Standby Force and other regional security issues. The committee is now funded by the ECOWAS Commission’s regular annual budget and meets twice a year.

The ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff—an exclusively military component—reviews security in the sub-region through quarterly meetings. The ECOWAS agency that is the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money-Laundering, or GIABA, is responsible for the prevention and control of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the West African Sub-Region. Critical to its mandate is the “improvement of measures and intensifying efforts to combat the laundering of proceeds of crime in West Africa”.

ECOWAS’s formulation of a regional response through their Political Declaration of 2005 (that put forward the idea of establishing a criminal investigative intelligence bureau) has helped nip the problem in the bud. However, considering the fact that that the Criminal Investigative Intelligence Bureau (CIIB) had been proposed as far back as 2002 by Ghana for a meeting of the INTERPOL-backed West Africa Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) in Abidjan, the challenge would have been better dealt with had member states resolved to establish the-said CIIB.

While ECOWAS community citizens continue to enjoy free movement in the sub-region, this is a region that has played host to internecine conflicts, such as the Liberian conflict of 1990 that prompted the intervention of ECOMOG. As I wrote back in October 2011, “add to that the porous border, the free movement of mercenaries, coupled with small arms trafficking and the recruitment of child soldiers and fighters to the cross-border crimes and we have ourselves a potential powder-keg that needs significant monitoring through significant systems of intelligence – as proposed by the yet-to-be-ratified CIIB”.

But that is not all. In 2012, ECOWAS is confronted by crisis in Northern Mali; piracy; and a Sahel crisis. These are new elements forcing ECOWAS to take the bull by the horns on factoring not just the visceral peace and security instruments it is so used to, but a law-enforcement perspective that is sufficiently holistic to secure and protect West Africans from criminals and miscreants.

In my 29 February edition for this column, entitled “West Africa Rising…in Regional Instability?”, I wrote “while the [ECOWAS] Authority has strongly condemned the MNLA rebellion in Mali and expressed its full support for efforts being exerted by Mali to ‘defend its territorial integrity’, the sub-regional organisation has not only called for “an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities by the rebels’’, but also approved the release of three million US dollars to assist Mali deal with the humanitarian consequences of the rebellion.”

At the time of writing, ECOWAS has done more than that—including the ECOWAS Commission urging member states and partners to “support the government of Mali with logistics and materiel as the country battles to defend its territorial integrity and restore law and order," the 15 nation ECOWAS said in a statement.

Furthermore, the ECOWAS Commission has called on Mali National Liberation Army to observe a ceasefire, and warned that ECOWAS would take "all necessary measures" to help Mali protect itself, without giving any further details. According to Reuters, the ECOWAS statement said it would also launch a mediation process "in the coming days".

Whither, again, the future of ECOWAS law enforcement?

You may re-call that on 4 August, ECOWAS, alongside international partners, established the so-called Border Information Centres (BIC). While far from a holistic response to tackling crime and enforcing a rule of law in the sub-region, it nevertheless is an important step in tackling cross-border corruption and helping mitigate cross-border crime by providing citizens with transparent ways of obtaining information on free movement in the sub-region.

Truth be told, I am not quite sure whether we can yet speak of an ECOWAS law enforcement system, which is ironic considering how ECOWAS does “peace and security” very well. On peace and security, ECOWAS has developed fairly elaborate protocols, such as the 1999 ECOWAS protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This enables ECOWAS intervene in conflicts in its member countries. ECOWAS also has Early Warning mechanism (ECOWARN), as well as a Mediation and Security Council, which is the key decision-making organ.

In its 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF)—which seeks to strengthen human security architecture in the ECOWAS sub-region— ECOWAS has developed a basis for a holistic and comprehensive action plan in the field of peace and security—but not on law enforcement. A review might be timely at a time when the sub-region is rocked by manifold crises—listed above.

Way Forward for ECOWAS

At a time when African integration observers are talking of a putative Arab Maghreb Union(AMU)-ECOWAS-CENSAD free trade area (along the lines of the tripartite COMESA-EAC-SADC free-trade area), this second FTA is unlikely to go anywhere quickly without ECOWAS getting very serious on distinguishing between what I would call “hard”(war; drug-trafficking; human-trafficking) and “soft”(cross-border and petty crime) conflict. It is very encouraging to read of Joint Border Patrols in the sub-region—as prescribed by the INTERPOL-backed West African Police Chiefs Committee.

Further, in response to the piracy threat in the Gulf of Guinea, Benin and Nigeria are conducting joint maritime patrols. Togo and Ghana are expected to join in these patrols as well. It is envisioned that the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS) is also conducting joint patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, with Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.

ECOWAS might not have had the foresight of establishing a West African law enforcement mechanism (like the EU did with EUROPOL with respect to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992) the very moment the Treaty of Lagos was revised in 1993 to reflect the current challenges of ECOWAS, but it can never be too late, I wrote in October 2011, “to rectify the imperative of a sub-regional police force along the likes of INTERPOL or EUROPOL”. ECOWAS's imperative and comparative strengths on peace, security, and conflict prevention ought to give it the necessary impetus to bring to fruition the belated “ECOWASPOL”/CIIB the sub-region so desperately needs.

That Guinea is the only country to have established the francophone counterpart of CIIB—ORIC—in its country is a woeful indictment of how seriously West African leaders take the establishment of crime prevention and management in the sub-region. Let us today help each other put pressure on the leaders of our respective member states to ratify the 2005 protocol on the criminal investigative intelligence bureau!

ENDs

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://www.critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: 0268.687.653.

---

[1] Online. Drug trafficking as a security threat in West Africa. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-as-a-security-threat-in-west-africa.html

[2] So far, only four selected countries of Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone are involved. These countries were chosen as they already have UN presences. The idea is to also extend it to Guinea-Conakry and other ECOWAS member states over time.

[3] Online. http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/ecowasresponseactionplan.html 

West Africa Rising…in Regional Instability?

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

West Africa Rising…in Regional Instability?

By E.K.Bensah Jr

In 2010, Spain made sports headline news for winning both the World Cup in South Africa and having its national – Rafael Nadal – become the first man to win three straight major tournaments in the same year. In 2011, the West African state of Burkina Faso has made ECOWAS history by winning both ECOWAS’s answer to the “tour de France” (the 2nd edition of the ECOWAS International Cycling Tour which ended in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire last week), and the top-job of ECOWAS Commission President. The new ECOWAS Head is former Prime Minister and current Ambassador of Burkina Faso to Brussels HE Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo who will serve in this capacity for four years.

If sports were ever a credible harbinger of politics and/or a country’s future, then Ghana’s loss at the Africa Cup of Nations 2012 (AFCON) probably should have been an indicator that the out-gone James Victor Gbeho departure was a foregone conclusion. Sadly, that logic is blown to smithereens when we realize that while Ghana earned 3^rd position at the ECOWAS Cycling tour, it could only leave with its tail between it legs at AFCON, ending up a sorry fourth.

On a serious note, some might say that West Africa’s been in the news for the wrong reasons. Once again, we have what some might call the establishment of a geriatric leader in Senegal’s Wade seeking to entrench his gerontocracy by standing a third term. Despite the ‘boo’s he received at the polls during the commencement of the election on Sunday 26^th, he remains steadfast in seeking his third term.

Neither the 150 election observers that ECOWAS dispatched to Senegal (comprising members from some of the ECOWAS institutions, such as the Council of the Wise; reps of the Community Court of Justice; ECOWAS Parliament; including legal and civil society electoral experts from West Africa), nor the AU/ECOWAS envoy Obasanjo has been able to do anything concrete to get Wade to consider his position. Truth be told, it is the former Nigerian leader—more than anyone—who has been tasked with the mandate of formulating a solution to the political permafrost. Regrettably, the only solution that has come thus far from Obasanjo has been for Wade—in the event of a win—to step down after two years.

Inevitably, the Western press is likely to have a field day (and frankly, so will African press!) that here is Obasanjo once again having failed to bring closure in 2011 to a crisis in Cote d’Ivoire and failing yet again in this instance. Elsewhere, some might have called for another envoy to have been appointed. It remains unclear who exactly appointed him as an AU/ECOWAS envoy. Although the decision was taken at the 40^th Ordinary Session that was represented by the 15 ECOWAS leaders, it is unclear whether it was a consensus choice. Still, that a plenipotentiary-of-sorts was dispatched at all speaks volumes of an emerging structure that the sub-region and the AU so badly needs.

ECOWAS emerging structures and the Mali crisis

While it might not be very clear to West Africans and other observers how elections observers were sent to Senegal, what we do know is that—and something that must be communicated more clearly to deflect perceptions of inertia on development in the sub-region—it is under ECOWAS’ Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance that enjoins ECOWAS member states to send observer missions to member states conducting presidential elections ‘as part of its determination to ensure democratic convergence across the sub-region.’

Another important structure has been that of the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff(CCDS) to review emerging security threats in the sub-region. In this case, however, following the 40^th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State from 16-17^th February, they have been tasked to review threats that pertain to the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea.

There is no secret to why the CCDS is meeting. The major reason has been because of Mali, where Tuareg fighters demanding an autonomous Azawad region are reported to have attacked no less than six Northern towns in the past month. Government forces have responded with helicopter gunships and heavy weapons fire. The violence has displaced at least 55000 people, with many taking refuge in neighbouring countries.

On ECOWAS’ part, while the Authority has strongly condemned the MNLA rebellion in Mali and expressed its full support for efforts being exerted by Mali to ‘defend its territorial integrity’, the sub-regional organisation has not only called for “an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities by the rebels’’, but also approved the release of three million US dollars to assist Mali deal with the humanitarian consequences of the rebellion. In addition, ECOWAS has called on humanitarian agencies, as well as the International Community, to join ECOWAS to take all necessary measures that would “guarantee protection, relief and succor for the populations adversely affected by the crises in Mali and Niger.”

Regrettably, it seems like West Africa is truly rising – as far as regional instability is concerned, for there remain threats of piracy and organized crime in the Gulf of Guinea. To this end, the ECOWAS Commission has been tasked to urgently develop a holistic strategic maritime policy framework to guide future actions and cooperation – even to the extent of soliciting collaboration and assistance from the Economic Community of Central African States(ECCAS) so as to ensure that challenges have been confronted in a concerted manner.

Make no mistake: ECOWAS has what is acknowledged not just among the seven other AU-recognised regional economic communities (RECs), but worldwide, what is acknowledged to be a sophisticated Peace and Security Architecture.

If you have forgotten, allow me to remind you that at a time after the fall of the Berlin Wall when a then-timorous USA and prevaricating UN Security Council was reluctant to act in Liberia, ECOWAS got involved itself in conflict management on an ad hoc basis, thanks, according to academic Dr. Niagalé Bagayoko, “to the set up in 1990 of a sub-regional intervention force, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)”. He continues that ECOMOG ‘acted as a buffer force in Liberia (1990-1998), in Sierra Leone (1997-2000) in Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), in Côte d‟Ivoire (2003) and again in Liberia (2003)’. It would be in 1999, that a Protocol creating the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security would be adopted.

Now while I may have liberally hinted West Africa is rising in regional instability, it certainly is a West Africa rising – for many more positive reasons, which will be played out over the weeks!

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: +233-268.687.653.

Pax Aufricana: Towards a Prosperous and United Africa by 2034?

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

Pax Aufricana: Towards a Prosperous and United Africa by 2034?

By E.K.Bensah Jr

The manifold tags of “Africa rising” and the whimsical “Pax Aufricana” (coined by yours truly) are all tags to connote something bigger happening on the continent of Africa. They are not chimerical aspirations of what some of us would like to see. Despite the claims that intra-african trade, for example, is around 11%, the fact remains that Africa, through the Union, is doing something about it by not just proposing a Continental (African) Free Trade Area(CFTA), but coming out with an action plan, which has measurable goals, targets and agreed timelines.

If the African Union can be so “cerebral” (read:meticulous) about something critical to the Union’s survival and prosperity, it beggars belief that the AU would seem to be operating on the blind side of a roadmap for its future. Let’s face it: much of the criticism leveled and aspersions cast on the AU have been pretty tough: it’s about the AU drinking tea at meetings and “doing nothing”. So we know the AU appears to be pretty impotent—some might say pusillanimous against the face of donors directing the strings of where the AU, in their eyes, ought to be – but we also know the AU has been very forthright and headstrong on its peace and security architecture. We know it was criticized on Cote d’Ivoire, and on Libya, but as then-AU Chairman Dr.Ping rightly said to BBC’s Stephen Sackur in a “Hardtalk” interview last year, the West barely gave the AU a chance to operationalise its roadmap.

It’s frankly risible to see the UN Security Council doing all it can to get China and Russia (who vetoed any kind of intervention in the crisis in Syria) to rescind and pursue diplomatic ventures alongside the Arab League, when the AU was never given a chance to pursue diplomacy as comprehensively as the Arab League has been given carte blanche to. But that’s another story!

Although in last week’s piece, I accentuated an understanding of the five pillars around the AU’s roadmap, the real story in this article is to elaborate on the AU’s Strategic Plan of 2009-2012. Given that this is the last year of its “realization”, I believe it’s not just fitting to expatiate on the plan, but imperative -- just as regional integration is to the continent of Africa.

Unlike the AU’s predecessor—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)—that was more concerned with supporting liberation movements in the erstwhile African territories under colonialism and apartheid, the AU has become the premier organization ‘spearheading Africa’s development and integration.’ That said, this is not the AU as an abstract construct, but the very specific African Union Commission.

The role of the African Union Commission (AUC)

The European Commission probably cannot yet be compared to the African Union Commission, especially now that the latter employs slightly over 20,000 Eurocrats (European international civil servants). The AUC employs a fraction of that, yet is charged with the delivery of the AU’s strategic plan. This might prompt speculation as to why it would be entrusted with such responsibility when it is understaffed. Before we get there, we need to understand a bit about the AUC.

The mission of the AUC is to become: “an efficient and value-adding institution driving the African integration and development process in close collaboration with African Union member states, the Regional Economic Communities and African citizens.” Despite the establishment of the RECs, let’s be clear that the AU has been around longer than the RECs so there is necessarily not only respect but experience that is conferred on it by virtue of it being the de jure successor of the OAU. As such, it remains the only unique Pan-African body that has the political mandate to develop the continental policy space and speak for Africa. Despite its good intentions, African Integration Actors (another whimsical coinage of yours truly), such as the UNECA and African Development Bank do not possess that ‘sui generis’ mandate.

This leads one to examine a bit more closely the so-called “strategic comparative advantages” that ‘constitute the core of its programming action’. These comparative advantages are consistent with the five emergent themes that exist for the AUC. These are: political integration; scientific, economic, social and physical integration and development; Governance; institutional capacity-building for continental integration and development; peace and security.

On POLITICAL INTEGRATION, the major strategic comparative advantage is the AUC having a mandate from the AU to undertake programmes on political integration, as well as the continental reach and mandate of fifty-four States to coordinate integration of Member states and RECs. 

On SCIENTIC, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL INTEGRATION…, the AUC is in a unique position to develop and design continent-wide integration programmes and projects, such as those on infrastructure, educational systems, ICT and research, etc.

With respect to GOVERNANCE, the Commission ‘provides the most practical arena to set up continental standards and approach on governance, and has the mandate to establish and implement governance-related initiatives such as APRM.’ In addition, it has political oversight and leadership ‘to determine and achieve an African indigenous, locally-driven and owned process of governance standards.’

As for INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT, the AUC is a strategic actor in the promotion and building of institutions and capacities for the continental integration and development agenda. It seeks to harmonise member states’ decisions and translates them into action plans to be implemented through/by member states and RECs.

Finally, on PEACE AND SECURITY, the AUC has the mandate to lead (and direct) peace and security programmes, as well as the capability to implement global and continent-wide decisions on conflict resolution, prevention and management.  As I indicated in the last piece, its 15-member Peace and Security Council (a hybrid of the UN’s Security Council and the AU’s own structures) is perhaps the greatest manifestation of the continent’s efforts to ensure Africa realises the prosperous and united Africa it seeks to do under the African Economic Community by 2034!

If you had any doubt about the AU’s Africa Peace and Security Architecture(APSA), I seriously entreat you to check out the AU’s Peace and Security Department website with updates from the AU’s Situation Room: http://www.peaceau.org/en/

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: +233-268.687.653.

Africa’s Plans cannot be Slaves to a Donor Construct!

“The Accidental Ecowas & AU Citizen”:

Pax Aufricana: Africa’s Plans cannot be Slaves to a Donor Construct!

By E.K.Bensah Jr

Perhaps one of the greatest sources of bemusement around African integration is the manner in which citizens remain clueless about the continent—and do not seem to want to change that ignorance into something positive. One is likely to hear more naysayers complaining about the continent than proponents praising it. If we can accept that a continent of now-54 member states would hardly and immediately have harmony on issues of trade; climate change; the environment and much more, why on Earth would we expect it to deliver so much so soon after only ten years in existence? This is also not to wholly put the blame on citizens, for these days, institutions like the African Union cannot get away with excuses that there are no resources for New Media and/or Social Networking strategies.

The visceral itch to refer to new Media is no accident: with smartphones booming across Africa, and an increasing number of Africans accessing the internet on their mobile phones, the 21^st century is spawning a new generation of savvy-activists very much into propagating and advocating issues almost at lightning-speed, and using tools like Twitter and Facebook.  At the very least, there are many youth on the continent intelligent and New-media-savvy enough to volunteer their time to helping out with the AU’s outreach. If no less than the UN Economic Commission for Africa can employ an Australian communications company to market the Africa Mining Vision, it beggars belief that the AU cannot source Pan-African volunteers to help them sell the image of the AU.

This message-selling cannot be divorced from the strategies I referred to last week, as, in my view, when an institution like the AU cannot sell its vision and its plan to the people of Africa, it constitutes a big problem. Inevitably, what one gets are many policy processes taking place on the blind-side of both citizens and the media, ineluctably making it imperative for “African integration watchers” everywhere to fight the good fight of promoting what the AU normally should.

The Strategies…

Even if we forget the AU has had Strategic Action Plans since the establishment and operationalisation of the AU in 2002, we surely cannot think that the AU has been working as slaves to a donor construct. While it is true that this-same construct has both helped and hindered Africa’s progress, it is not for a want of trying to break free – as Africa has done back in 2001 with the Lusaka Appeal, when it admitted that much of the funding offered by donors was slow and unrealistic. Even before the explosive events of Cote d’Ivoire in 2011 and the demise of Qaddafi, the AU had been discussing – by way of a committee – alternative sources of financing. 

Indeed, one of the major outputs of the Fourth Conference of African Ministers of Integration (COMAI IV) was on innovative financing that would lend a great deal of independence to the AU to finance its integration. This development must surely be seen as a boon to the efforts of African integration policymakers. If it fails to whet one’s appetite, how about this for size: the fact that the AU has no less than four sector-specific architectures in place for the radical transformation of the AU.

Let’s not even get to the fact that since 1994, the AU has been operating under the framework of the Abuja Treaty that has set continental integration for 2034. And these are even things I have not mentioned in detail. But, seriously, the things I will elaborate on are important. They concern peace and security; agriculture/food security’ governance and international trade, with a view to the establishment of an African Common Market—as envisaged by policymakers back in December 1976, when they proclaimed it as the Kinshasa Declaration—and one that is also consistent with the sixth stage of the Africa Economic Community.

Where’s the AU’s Strategic Plan?

Although we can freely and justifiably criticize the AU for a number of non-adhered-to policies, we must give them the credit for posting a considerable number of their material on their website. It is true the website on www.au.int might be incomparable to the EU’s on europa.eu.int, but at the end of the day, it is serious work in progress – as is the AU’s Strategic Action Plan of 2009-2012. Unbeknownst to many Africans, this can easily be found in a Google search [if Africans knew at all it had a strategic plan is moot!] and downloaded for perusal. At 46 pages, it does not make bedtime reading, and can be read within a few days.

Some of the sections include the “vision” of the African Union; “mission and values of the African Union Commission”; even a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses; Opportunities; and Threats) analysis; and a “comparative strategic analysis”. There are elaborations on “peace and security” (pillar 1); “development, integration and cooperation” (pillar 2); “shared values” (pillar 3); and “institution and capacity-building” (pillar 4). Finally, there is an implementation strategy, followed by a “monitoring and evaluation system.”

Pillar One – peace and security

It is fair to say that since its inception, the AU has been preoccupied by peace and security. Given the unpredictable nature of conflicts on the continent, the Peace and Security Council—voted the most powerful organ of  the AU in 2011 and arguably the most visible manifestation of the AU’s efforts resolving continental conflict—has been meeting on average around five times a month since 2006. This has inevitably added a burden on the 15-member Peace and Security Council—especially those with skeletal staff at their embassies.  

The PSC is meant to serve as the collective security and early warning instrument for “timely and efficient response” to both existing and emerging conflict crises and situations on the continent. It is supported by the AU commission; a Panel of  the Wise; a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); an African Standby Force(ASF); and a Special Fund (including an AU situation room located in the Peace and Security Directorate of the AU). Collectively, this is what is known as the AU Peace and Security Architecture. It is to promote peace, security, and stability in Africa. Inevitably, given this structure, it remains imperative that peace and security be strategic issues for the AU. By close of 2012—as per the strategic plan—the Commission expects, inter alia, to have a fully functioning APSA; significantly reduced conflicts on the continent; promoted the development and stablisation of security, political and economic systems; and promoted a policy on combating transnational organized crime.

Pillar Two – Development; Integration and Cooperation

Critical to the AU Commission’s work is the identification of key challenges to social and human development, such as poor health and education systems; lack of social welfare and protection of vulnerable groups…, gender inequalities..., creative industries and sports development. The AU intends to achieve sustainable economic development through accelerating infrastructure development to boost interconnectivity, reliability and cost-effectiveness; promoting the growth of intra-African trade and investments, and through integrating Africa into the global market. This includes the development of an African private sector and informal economy; as well as the promotion of agricultural development and food security through the Comprehensive Agricultural Africa Development Programme (CAADP).

By the end of 2012, the AU Commission expects to have achieved some of the following results: promoted agricultural development and food security; promoted the development of an African private sector and informal economy (note how widespread this is on the continent); and implement programmes for youth development.

In my next piece, I will be elaborating a bit more on the two other parts of the second pillar, and expatiate on the third pillar. Further I will offer an analysis of what we can learn from the SWOT analysis that came out of brainstorming by the AU’s staff and senior management meetings of the 2004-2007 Strategic Action Plan.  Suffice-to-say, it is eye-opening in a way that takes us away from being slaves to the traditional donor construct the AU has been so used to!

In 2009, in his capacity as a “Do More Talk Less Ambassador” of the 42^nd Generation—an NGO that promotes and discusses Pan-Africanism--Emmanuel gave a series of lectures on the role of ECOWAS and the AU in facilitating a Pan-African identity. Emmanuel owns "Critiquing Regionalism" (http://critiquing-regionalism.org). Established in 2004 as an initiative to respond to the dearth of knowledge on global regional integration initiatives worldwide, this non-profit blog features regional integration initiatives on MERCOSUR/EU/Africa/Asia and many others. You can reach him on ekbensah@ekbensah.net / Mobile: +233-268.687.653.